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ABSTRACT
This note addresses the reasons why additive and multiplicative demand uncertainty
produce differently signed biases in output price as compared to the certainty case in two-
period monopoly models. With multiplicative uncertainty the price should be set above the
certainty level while for additive uncertainty the price should be lower than the certainty
level. This note gives an intuitive explanation for the result after first presenting a
parsimonious review of the two models. We also discuss which, if either, of the two models
is more realistic.
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1. Introduction
Investment under uncertainty has recently been dominated by real option models that stress
the value of waiting or the value of flexibility. This contrasts with more traditional two-
period models where convexity of the marginal profit under risk was argued to bias
decisions (Abel 1983); or where the bias arose from a discontinuity in the profit function in
the fix-price capacity-rationing case (Nickell 1978; Aiginger 1987; Lambert and Mulkay
1990). In our view, two-period models involving bets rather than options are still important
in many economic applications.
To motivate the paper, imagine that you are the organiser of a concert or exhibition where
the floor space or capacity has to be decided in advance of the show and where the price is
also set in advance. The demand is only known stochastically. How should price and
capacity be set? Should the price of tickets be higher or lower than under certainty?
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It turns out that the nature of the bias that is introduced depends radically on the type of
demand uncertainty that is assumed. With multiplicative uncertainty the price should be set
above the certainty level while for additive uncertainty the price should be lower than the
certainty level. Most authors assume one or the other form of uncertainty in their models,
e.g. additive (Pennings 2001) or multiplicative (Driver et al 1993; 1996). And although the
result may be traced back to the classic edited collection of Arrow et al (1962), it has never
been satisfactorily explained why the apparently minor change in specification of stochastic
demand can have such radical implications for the bias to price under uncertainty.
2 Thus
this note also serves as a warning to those working on uncertainty that results may be very
sensitive to exact specifications.
                                                
1 Other contexts where the model applies include manufactured items where capacity is decided in advance
and for marketing reasons the price has to be announced and held whatever the demand (new cars, seasonal
toys and products that become obsolete at the end of a period are sometimes cited as examples). This context -
where both price and quantity or capacity have to be set ex-ante - is regarded by firms as highly relevant. See
the discussion of “P-Q models” in Aiginger 1987, p.163-7; Karlin and Carr 1962; Driver et al 1993; 1996. See
also Dana and Petruzzi (2001) for a recent contribution that extends the classic newsvendor problem by
introducing an exogenous outside option for consumers.
2 We focus on the price results rather than the bias that is caused to capacity under uncertainty. This is
because the results for price are quite general whereas the result for capacity in the multiplicative case
requires some restrictions on the demand curve (Driver et al 1993).2
2. Formal derivation of the results
Let us denote by D0(p) the certainty demand curve. In the multiplicative case, certainty
demand is multiplied by a stochastic shift term; in the additive case, a stochastic term is
added to the certainty demand curve. Realised demand is in the two cases:
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A risk-neutral monopolist sets the price p and the capacity Y before uncertain demand is
realised. Capacity costs c per unit. Denoting by X expected sales, we have:
Additive Multiplicative
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In each case we define profit and the two first-order conditions:
0 / / = ∂ ∂ + = ∂ Π ∂ p X p X p (1)
0 / / = − ∂ ∂ = ∂ Π ∂ c Y X p Y (2)
2.1 Additive vs multiplicative: expected sales and the incidence of rationing
We now explain the contrasting results between the models.
3 It is useful to make a change
of variable. In the additive case, define  ) ( 0 p D Y z
a − =  as the (additive) capacity stance
level, which represents the planned margin of spare capacity or the difference between the
set capacity and expected demand. In the multiplicative case, define  ) ( / 0 p D Y z
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multiplicative capacity stance ratio. Since actual capacity at a given price can be set below
or above unconstrained expected demand, it follows that z
a can be either negative of
positive, and z
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From the final twin expressions above it is obvious that expected sales will be lower than
(unconstrained) certain demand. So there will be a demand loss due to rationing. But in the
additive case the loss depends only on z
a, while, for a given z
k, in the multiplicative case the
loss will be lower at higher prices. This gives a first hint: in a sense, the pricing decision
may be used in the k-model to "reduce" uncertainty by setting high prices, while this does
not happen with the a-model (for a given z
a). 
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2.2 Additive vs multiplicative: profit maximisation
To derive formal results we focus on the profit functions. For now onwards, to save on
notation, we simply refer to z with no superscript, knowing that it represents a level and a
ratio in the two cases. Define expected profit:
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3 For the reader who prefers to see a graphical presentation, the multiplicative case is drawn and discussed in
Appendix 1.
4 Alternatively, we may see this by contrasting the two expressions for expected sales X given before (1)
above. We note that the level difference (Y - X) conditional on a given F(·) depends on p (via D0) in the
multiplicative case but not in the additive case. This (Y - X) term denotes the expected quantity of rationing
for a given F(·). In the multiplicative case (but not the additive one) a higher p leads to a lower level of
expected rationing for any given F(·).4
Hence, the expected profit can be conveniently decomposed into the sum of different terms.
The intuitive explanation for these terms may be simply explained. The first term (A)
coincides with the unconstrained profit under certainty, that is maximised at the certainty
price p
c, obtained from:
0 ) ( ) ( ) ( 0 0 = ′ − +
c c c p D c p p D (4)
The second term (B) represents the loss from carrying precautionary capacity of quantity z
(the difference between capacity and expected demand) at unit cost c. The third term (C) is
the expected value of lost sales due to capacity rationing that occurs whenever a > z.
Multiplicative
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Here the first term (A) is identical to the additive case. The remaining terms have parallel
interpretations to the additive case. The second term (B) represents the expected cost of
carrying precautionary capacity of amount Y - D0 = D0(z - 1). The third term (C) represents,
as in the additive case, the value of the lost sales due to rationing where the averaging is
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convenient to rewrite eq. (5) as:
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2.3 Optimal capacity stance, z
The problem that we now study is the maximisation of the expression of expected profit
with respect to p and z. This is of course a simultaneous choice, but let us do it in two steps.
Imagine that the price is somehow fixed, and consider the optimal choice of z. We have:5
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Hence, in both cases the FOC w.r.t. the capacity stance can be re-written as:
c p pF − = ⋅ ) (  (6)
This is the solution to the traditional newsvendor problem, where price is exogenously set.
There is no difference between the a-model and the k-model when the price is treated as an
exogenous variable.
The FOC w.r.t. z (eq. (6)) has an intuitive interpretation (see also Fig. 1). The gain to
revenue stemming from an increment to Y (or z) will only occur if the firm is already
capacity constrained (probability = 1 – F(·)) but the cost incurred (c) is unconditional.
Expected value of the increment to Y should be zero at the optimal Y: (p – c)(1 – F(·)) –
cF(·) = 0, which is the same as (6).
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2.4 Optimal price, p
In contrast to the above, for a given z, the a-model and the k-model exhibit fundamental
differences w.r.t. the choice of the price. This can be seen by direct inspection of eq. (3) and
eq. (5bis).
In the a-model, expected sales is split into riskless demand minus a loss term that is not
sensitive to price changes. When we turn to the profit, this is equal to the riskless profit
(term A, maximized at p
c), minus a "sunk cost" to carry extra-capacity (term B, this comes
with its algebraic sign), minus the value of the demand loss that is lower the lower is the
price (term C). Overall, the firm will want for sure to set a price below the monopoly
certainty price.
In the k-model, once the capacity stance is fixed, there is no first-order effect from the loss
term given by term B' (starting from the certainty price), while term C' is minimised for
very high prices. The effect of the high price here is to reduce the likelihood of rationed
demand. Hence there is a natural tendency to push the price above the certainty level, for
any value of the capacity stance. The effect here is due to lower precautionary capacity at
higher prices in the multiplicative case as the expected level of planned excess capacity
decreases while the ratio of planned excess capacity to expected demand remains constant.
The above intuitive account can be complemented by expressing the derivative of profit
with respect to price. After some manipulation we obtain from eq. (3) and (5bis) the
contrasting expressions below which show the opposite signed effects:
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2.5 Alternative treatment of the first order condition w.r.t. p
It is also interesting, if somewhat circuitous, to contrast the FOC w.r.t. p in terms of expected
sales for a given Y. From eq. (1), the derivative  p X ∂ ∂ /  may be derived as follows:
Additive
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In the multiplicative case,  p X ∂ ∂ /  is lower (in absolute terms) than the additive
corresponding term D'0F(·). In particular,  ∫ ′
z
k k F k p D ) ( d ) ( 0  is a weighted average over the
unconstrained (lower demand) regime, with mean (unconstrained) weight equal to unity. In
the k-model, the unconstrained states are those states when demand has higher absolute
elasticity than the average, which explains the tendency to charge higher prices.
For a formal proof for the k-model, we can manipulate (1) as follows:
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Using the certainty condition for maximising profit (eq. (4)), it is immediate to see that the
last term in the square bracket in eq. (9) is equal to zero when evaluated at the certainty price
p
c. This implies that, as before, price is higher than the certainty price under multiplicative
uncertainty.
We give below a parallel alternative proof for the additive case that the uncertainty price is
lower than the certainty price. Using (7) and substituting (6) into (1)8
gives: 0 ) )( ( ) , ( 0 = − ′ + c p p D Y p X  which, when evaluated at the certainty price, may be
compared with the certainty condition for maximum profit, equation (4). As proved earlier,
expected sales must be less than certainty unconstrained demand: 0 ) ( ) , ( 0 < −
c c p D Y p X .
Thus, expected marginal profit w.r.t. p under additive uncertainty is less than zero at the
certainty price p
c and price should accordingly be lower under this form of uncertainty.
3. Which model is more realistic?
Given the contrasting results of the two models it seems important to consider which, if
either, has a better claim to realism. This question was considered in Aiginger (1987, p. 166)
but he concluded that there was no rational economic basis to choose between the
specifications. In this final section we offer a slightly different perspective. We consider
constant elasticity demand curves and note that the conjectured price elasticity of demand
may remain invariant to the realisation of high or low demand schedules only in the
multiplicative case. In the additive case, by contrast, the (absolute) elasticity is lower in the
case of high realised demand than under certainty.
5 This makes the elasticity anti-cyclical,
even under monopoly. Some industrial economists have argued that in different market
structures, thin-market effects or easier collusion in recessions should make the elasticity
pro-cyclical, while others argue for an a-cyclical or pro-cyclical mark-up (for this debate, see
Bloch and Olive 2001, Haskel et al 1995, Rotemberg and Saloner 1986). Even under
monopoly there may be different views as to the cyclicality of the elasticity and one’s
modelling strategy in setting up the stochastic demand equations may be influenced by one’s
beliefs in respect of that. Those who want to hedge their bets can do so by choosing the
multiplicative model where the effect can be neutral.
                                                
5 To see this, consider the intersection of each parallel realised demand curve with the ray P = Q in a standard
demand curve setting in P-Q space. The slopes of the demand curves at these intersections measure inverse
demand elasticities. A conjectured translation to the right of the demand curve (say from central demand D0 to
high realized demand D1) corresponds to conjectured upward cyclical movement. Since the derivative of P
w.r.t. Q is higher at this intersection of the ray than at the central demand intersection, the absolute elasticity of
demand is lower at high realised demand.9
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Appendix 1. Graphical presentation
Both eq. (1) and eq. (2) in the text can be represented in a diagram. Fig. A1 plots a graphical
solution for the multiplicative case.
6 The thick line represents expected sales X for a given Y.
Clearly, X coincides with D0(p) when prices are so high that there is never rationing. X starts
departing from certainty demand when prices are lowered such that  Y p D k ≥ ) ( 0 , where the
limiting condition is obtained, in graphical terms, as the resulting price when Y hits the
highest possible realization of demand (in the figure, this happens for prices below .705). We
can also quite easily anticipate that X has to coincide with Y when prices are so low that
demand is always rationed, in all possible states, i.e.  Y p D k ≥ ) ( 0 . In graphical terms, the
limiting price is obtained as the resulting price when Y hits the lowest possible realized
demand (prices below .114 in the figure).
Similarly, marginal revenue coincides first with certainty marginal revenue, then the two
curves depart when sales start being capacity constrained (eq. (1)). Notice that for the
parameter constellation chosen in Fig. A1, the plot of marginal revenue under certainty
coincides with the realization in the lowest state kD0(p). This was simply done to keep the
number of curves drawn in the diagram at a minimum and to prevent cluttering the diagram.
As far as optimality w.r.t. Y is concerned, when the firm is not capacity constrained (which
happens for high prices), an increase in Y would not cause a change in X. As the price is
reduced,  X becomes more and more sensitive to an increase in Y, which explains the
increasing curve depicting eq. (2). At equilibrium, the marginal revenue w.r.t. price is set
equal to zero (eq. (1)) and, simultaneously, capacity is optimally set where the marginal cost
c is equal to the marginal benefit (eq. (2)). The corresponding optimal price for this
multiplicative example is denoted by p
m. The graphical representation for the additive case
would show similar behavior of the curves.
[Figure A1]
                                                
6 Fig. 1 is drawn for the following specification: D0(p) = 1 - p, c = 0.2, k uniformly distributed between 0.5 and
1.5. The certainty price is p
c = 0.6. The optimal price and capacity under uncertainty are respectively p
m =
0.624346 and Y = 0.443145.